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Bechthold: US Close Air Support in Normandy

B. Michael Bechthold

I

n the climactic scene of the highly-acclaimed
Saving Private Ryan, the beleaguered Ranger
and Airborne forces of Captain John Miller (Tom
Hanks) are about to be overrun. Against
overwhelming odds they have fought to save a
crucial stone bridge over the Merderet River. It
is a losing battle. With defeat imminent, the
Americans retreat across the bridge and prepare
to blow it. However, before that can happen,
Captain Miller is shot and is unable to detonate
the explosives. As a German tank rumbles across
the bridge it appears all is lost. Then, in typical
Hollywood tradition, the cavalry arrives - two
P-51 Mustangs. With uncanny timeliness and
pinpoint accuracy they knock out the German
tank on their first pass without destroying either
the bridge or the American infantry who are mere
yards away.
Though this may be a fitting end to a very
good movie, it is not representative of the
capabilities of tactical air power, especially early
in the Normandy campaign. Leaving aside the
question of accuracy ,1 the system of air support
in place at the outset of the invasion was much
too cumbersome to allow an intervention of this
nature. The Americans went into Normandy with
a system of Close Air Support (CAS) that was
largely derived from the British experience in
North Africa. It was based on the belief that
centralized control of air assets was the most
effective method of employment. However,
following D-Day, the system in place was far too
unwieldy to provide effect support. Over the next
three months, most of the existing doctrine was
effectively discarded. An air support organization
emerged that was the complete antithesis to that
with which the Americans had started. The

system which evolved proved to be highly
effective, flexible and able to adapt quickly to a
variety of situations.

The First Test: North Africa

T

he Americans started the war with a basic
grasp of the tenets of CAS. The air and
ground forces talked of close cooperation, but in
reality they remained far apart in their visions of
tactical air support. The first serious American
attempt at producing a modern, workable tactical
air doctrine came in April 1942 with the
publication of War Department Basic Field
Manual 31-35, "Aviation in Support of the
Ground Forces." This manual provided sound
principles to guide future air-ground operations.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , FM 3 1 - 3 5 was to prove
unsuccessful when given its baptism of fire in
North Africa in late 1942.

Operation "Torch," the Allied invasion of
North Africa in November 1942, brought the
problems of conducting effective air support
operations to light. Many of the notions, tactics
and equipment the Americans had brought to
North Africa were found to be unworkable,
outclassed or obsolete. Light bombers, for
instance, expected to perform the majority of
close support work, were found to be terribly
vulnerable to German air and ground defences.
An attempt to fill this unexpected gap with the
use of fighters met with another difficulty. Most
fighter pilots were not trained in ground strafing
and their aircraft were not fitted with bomb
racks. 2
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Operations during November and December
served to show that a large gap existed between
American air doctrine a n d its p r a c t i c a l
employment. FM 31-35 seems to have been
virtually discarded once actual operations began.
Army Ground Force commanders moved quickly
to assert their dominance over the Air Forces and
received very little opposition. The ad hoc system
which developed by the end of 1942 proved to
be quite ineffective. But, there was hope on the
horizon. The British system of CAS that evolved
in the Middle East between General B.L.
Montgomery, commander of 8th Army, and Air
Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander
of the Western Desert Air Force, had proven
e n o r m o u s l y s u c c e s s f u l . With no o t h e r
alternatives, the Americans turned to the British
for help.

anointed as the creators of a revolutionary new
system of air-ground cooperation. This was not
quite accurate. Their ideas were not new, but they
had been the first on the Allied side to implement
the concepts successfully. The American airmen
became disciples of the British doctrine, not
because of its originality, but because they could
use its success to convince the Ground Forces of
the utility of the new doctrine, something they
had hitherto been unable to achieve.

In early 1943, Coningham was promoted to
command the Northwest African Tactical Air
Forces (NATAF) and he made his presence felt
immediately. The NATAF was designed to provide
air support to each of the three armies operating
in Africa. No longer were his units to be used in
defensive missions. The air umbrella was
discontinued and the control of aircraft was
removed from First Army and II Corps.
Henceforth, all requests for air support had to
be made through Coningham. Fighters and
fighter-bombers began flying offensive missions
aimed at destroying the Luftwaffe and gaining air
superiority. As well, the emphasis on ground
targets shifted. Tanks were declared to be
unprofitable targets due to the difficulty, and
expense, of attempts to destroy them. Instead,
enemy troop c o n c e n t r a t i o n s a n d motor
transport, targets well within the capabilities of
the airmen, became the preferred targets. 3
Though the changes took time to make an impact,
the NATAF was to become a very effective force
under Coningham's direction.4

LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE COEQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES;
NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER...

Coningham and his NATAF were to have a
significant effect on the development of American
tactical air doctrine. Though it was true that
American airmen had developed a sound doctrine
of their own, they had been unable to convince
the Army Ground Forces of the applicability of
their ideas. As a result, the Air Force found itself
being utilized by Ground Force commanders in
a manner that did not take full advantage of the
air weapon. This was where the British influence
was critical. Coningham and Montgomery were

North Africa forced the Americans to
overhaul their doctrine for air support. The
result, published in J u l y 1943, was War
Department Field Manual 100-20, "Command
and Employment of Air Power."5 The main ideas
contained in FM 100-20 are explicitly stated in
capital letters at the beginning of the manual:

THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER
IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY
MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE
WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR
POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN
TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE
AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING
FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE.
CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST
BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE
EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
IF
THIS
INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A
KNOCKOUT BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY
EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND
OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER
OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE
SUPERIOR COMMANDERS CHARGED WITH
THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN
THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE
COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE
AIR FORCE COMMAND AND COMMAND OF
GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE GROUND
FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR
COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR
FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES
UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH
GROUND F O R C E S ARE OPERATING
INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY
DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS.6

The statements contained in FM 100-20 were a
deliberate a t t e m p t to avoid t h e pitfalls
experienced in North Africa. The co-equal status
of the Army and the Air Force, the principle of
centralized control and the flexibility of tactical
air power are dominant themes in this manual.
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FM 100-20 also introduced the concept of the
prioritization of the missions of the tactical air
force. The first phase of operations was to gain
air superiority. Without this pre-condition, the
operational advantage passed to the enemy. The
second priority was interdiction or the prevention
of hostile troops and supplies from moving
within, or to, the battle area. Once these first two
missions had been accomplished, attention could
focus on third phase operations - the support of
ground forces in the immediate battle area. The
manual stated, "in the zone of contact, missions
against hostile units are most difficult to control,
are most expensive and are, in general, least
effective. Targets are small, well-dispersed, and
difficult to locate...Only at critical times are
contact zone missions profitable."7
The arrangement of the three main missions
of the tactical air force makes sense but only in a
conceptual manner. The attainment of air
superiority was an essential prerequisite for other
close air support operations. However, the strict
ranking of missions seemed to preclude the
various operations from taking part along side
each other. This, combined with the fact that close
support of the army was relegated to third
priority, left many army commanders wondering
how committed the air force was to its support.
This question could not be answered until the
Allies turned their attention to continental
Europe.
The acceptance of FM 100-20 did not happen
immediately. The new manual caused quite a stir
when it was published because there was no

consultation or approval sought from General
McNair and the Army Ground Forces. This
preemptive move, considered by some to be a
"Declaration of Independence," tended to support
the view that the Air Force had only its best
interests in mind and FM 100-20 was merely an
attempt to gain freedom of action from the Army.
In spite of this opposition, the new doctrine
quickly became part of the curriculum at Army
ground schools. 8
FM 100-20 provided the structure for the air
support system that the Americans went with into
Normandy. However, the limitations of this new
doctrine were quickly exposed and within days
of the invasion a new system began to evolve
which proved very successful, but was quite a
departure from FM 100-20.

Normandy and the Battlefield
Evolution of Close Air Support

I

n the early morning of 6 June 1944 the Allies
launched the largest amphibious landing in
history. By the end of the day, a foothold on the
continent had been achieved. However, it would
take nearly two months of intense combat to
break out of the beachhead and a further six
weeks to send the Germans into a headlong
retreat towards Germany. During this period, IX
Tactical Air Command (IX TAC) in cooperation
with the First United States Army (FUSA) evolved
an effective system of close air support that
greatly facilitated the winning of the war.

A P-47 Thunderbolt takes off from a frontline landing strip after being refuelled and rearmed by mechanics
of the 9th Air Force Service Command. The strip is still in process of construction and work goes on despite
aircraft landing and taking off.
(USAF Photo PRO HQ 44-1533)
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Ninth US Air Force fighter pilots, operating from one
of the first airstrips in Normandy, join an early
morning chowline for breakfast. The flightline of
P-47 Thunderbolts is visible in the background.
Representative on each ship acted as air advisor
to the commanding generals of the army, corps
and divisions engaged in operations. All air
cooperation requests that were sent direct to
Uxbridge by Air Support Parties attached to the
troops ashore were to be monitored and those
that were deemed unnecessary, wasteful or too
dangerous, were vetoed. As well, the air
representatives could originate air support
requests and convey information on weather and
the bombline to the Air Force.11 The Senior Air
Representative also had a direct role to play in
battle.

During the planning for Operation "Neptune,"
special arrangements were made for the control
of aircraft on tactical air missions. Hillingdon
House in Uxbridge, England became the focal
point for these operations. A key component of
this control centre - the Operations Cell - was
responsible for the coordination of close air
support. It received requests from US Air
Support Parties and British Visual Control Posts
or from ground commanders directly. These
requests were evaluated and either refused or
passed on to the appropriate air operations
room. The Operations Cell also had the authority
to develop air support missions on its own
initiative and was responsible for setting and
adjusting the bombline based on information
provided by the other two cells. The facilities at
Hillingdon House comprised the U.K.-based half
of the air support system. 9
In many respects, the duties of the Combined
Control Centre at Uxbridge were duplicated
onboard the headquarters ships USS Ancon and
USS Bayfield off the French coast.10 The principal
role of the air representatives on board was to
direct offensive air operations in support of the
a r m y on t h e b e a c h e s . The S e n i o r Air

Upon arrival in the invasion area, American
fighter-bombers were required to check in with
the Ancon or Bayfield prior to executing their
attack. This served two functions. First, it allowed
the pilot to be briefed on the latest target
conditions and to be given a final vector or visual
landmark to the target. The second function was
to provide the air representative the opportunity
to divert aircraft to targets of greater importance.
These usually consisted of fleeting targets of
opportunity reported by air support parties or
by tactical reconnaissance flights.12
The air support system created for the
invasion was highly centralized. Primary control
of the aircraft rested with the air commanders
at Hillingdon House. The air representatives
located on the headquarters ships exercised
some mission control but were generally limited
to providing pilots with a final briefing. The air
support rendered during the landings would
consist primarily of pre-arranged missions.
Though the British did not employ their Visual
Control Posts during the actual assault, the
Americans sent their equivalent Air Support
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact
aircraft overhead unless they received prior
authorization to do so. The restrictions on
communications were so severe that the ASPs
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the
wrong target. The rationalization behind these

10
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orders is not immediately understandable but
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air
Force did not want their forward attack control
to develop into target control, and thus erode the
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of
air support. 13
The first targets hit by the fighter-bombers
of Ninth Air Force on the morning of 6 June were
two coastal gun batteries, six bridges and a rail
embankment. The gun batteries, located behind
Omaha beach at Maisy and Gefosse-Fontenay,
were capable of disrupting the American
landings. The result of the air strikes, by 18 and
15 aircraft respectively, were reported as "good"
and "excellent." The bridge-busting attacks in the
Cherbourg Peninsula destroyed three of the
targets and registered hits on the remaining
spans. 14
Following the completion of the pre-arranged
support on D-day, the fighter-bombers of the
Ninth Air Force were made available to meet any
immediate needs of the Ground Forces. The plan
called for at least one squadron to patrol each
beach throughout the day. They were under the
control of the headquarters ships which could
direct them to targets impeding the advance of

the troops. If no requests had been received by
the end of the patrol, the squadrons had orders
to attack pre-arranged targets before heading
home. 15 During the afternoon and early evening
of 6 June, 13 requests were made. Five were
refused for various reasons including weather,
impending darkness, the unavailability of aircraft
and coverage by other missions. The remaining
eight requests were accepted and a total of 11
missions resulted. The majority of the missions
were directed against gun batteries n e a r
Carentan, Maisy, Isigny and Bayeux. The
importance of these targets prompted MajorGeneral Leonard T. Gerow, Commanding General
V Corps, to contact the headquarters of Ninth
Air Force personally and request, "continuous
fighter bomber support to search out and attack
enemy artillery firing on the beaches." 16 This
entreaty was fully endorsed by General Elwood
R. Quesada, Commander of IX TAC. A series of
attacks on the coastal batteries resulted in
numerous direct hits being reported and the
missions were considered to be generally
successful. Other request missions carried out
included armed reconnaissance of the three main
roads leading from Coutances, and attacks on a
number of convoys, trains and other targets of
opportunity.17

Ground crew refuel and rearm a P~47 in preparation for another sortie in Normandy.
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The request missions flown on the first day
of the invasion were quite successful. However,
even at this early stage a number of problems
were apparent. As the official Air Force History
states, "The first day's experience disclosed that
the control mechanism centred at Uxbridge,
however logically it may have been planned, was
too involved in operation for the speedy provision
of air support."18 Though the Overlord plan called
for a continuous rotation of alert squadrons,
these proved insufficient to meet the needs of the
situation. A greater number of squadrons had to
be put at the disposal of the air representatives
on the headquarters ships. This problem was
compounded by a number of communications
difficulties. The VHF radios sent ashore with the
ASPs (SCR-284s with a maximum range of 25
miles) could not reach the Combined Control
Center at Uxbridge. As a result, their requests
had to be passed on by the headquarters ships.
As well, there were intermittent communications
failures on board one of the headquarters ships.19
These problems resulted in an expeditious
reorganization of the air support system shortly
after the invasion. To streamline the system of
target selection, the Senior Air Representative
aboard the headquarters ships Ancon was
provided with a greater n u m b e r of alert
squadrons to which he could assign targets based
on requests from Air Support Parties, tactical
reconnaissance reports and other sources. The
Senior Air Representative could also direct the
squadrons to undertake armed reconnaissance
behind the German lines to seek targets of
opportunity.20
In the initial period following the invasion,
tactical air operations continued in the pattern
set on D-day. The number of air support requests
increased gradually, but mission acceptance
depended on the weather. Air operations were
severely limited by weather on 8 June and totally
scrubbed the next day. It must be remembered
that all Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers were
based in England during this period. Good
weather was needed on both sides of the Channel
for operations to be carried out. Weather became
less of a problem once a significant number of
fighter-bomber groups were moved to France,
however, it always remained a factor.21
On 10 June the second step towards a more
decentralized air support system was taken. On

that day, Ninth Air Force issued General Order
No.158 which authorized IX TAC to assume
operational control of all fighter-bombers arriving
on the continent. This did not mean much at that
point since no groups were yet based in France.
There were, however, a number of operational
airfields used by aircraft on roulement, a
technique which allowed aircraft to take-off in
England, carry out a mission and then land at
one of the French airstrips to refuel and rearm
and then fly another mission. The fighterbombers would continue to stage out of France
until the end of the day when they would return
to England for the night. Roulement allowed for
a much shorter t u r n a r o u n d time between
missions than if they had to return to England
following the expenditure of their bombs, fuel and
ammunition. 22
The activation of Advanced Headquarters, IX
TAC, along with the 70th Fighter Wing at Au Gay,
France marked the beginning of the transition
period from the assault air support organization
to a close partnership between IX TAC and FUSA.
The headquarters of FUSA was located only a
hedgerow away from that of IXTAC. On 13 June,
IX TAC began to exercise operational control
through the 70th Fighter Wing but it was five days
later that the organization gained its relative
independence. Until that time all air support
requests continued to go to Uxbridge. This soon
changed:
Effective midnight 17-18 June this Headquarters
[IXTAC advanced] in conjunction with 1st Army
will a s s u m e responsibility for designating
bomblines. Will also assume responsibility for
operating Air Support Net. Submitting those
requests that cannot be met by local resources
to Ninth AF.23

This marked a major change in the provision
of close air support. First Army would now have
to go no further than a couple hundred yards to
the control centre where air support was
arranged. The Advanced Headquarters of IX TAC
assumed control for filtering and acting upon air
support requests. Ninth Air Force would only be
involved in the process if IX TAC could not meet
the requests with the aircraft at its disposal.
Generally, this meant the use of medium
bombers. For those additional resources,
requests would continue to go to Hillingdon
House.24

12
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The activation of the combined IXTAC-FUSA
headquarters on 17 June marked the start of
the decentralization of the assault air support
system. By the time of the operation to capture
the Cherbourg Peninsula, the joint headquarters
was in operation processing air support requests.
However, it did not reach full stride until early
July. At its heart was the combined operations
room which acted as a collection point, filter and
action centre for all air support requests. Three
types of requests were processed: planned
missions, request missions and immediate
request missions.
Planned missions were defined as sorties to
be flown the next day or on succeeding days. They
originated with the ground forces at either the
divisional or corps level. Request missions were
required on the same day, but the exact timing
was not crucial. These requests followed the
same channels from the division or corps to the
combined operations room. The decision on the
request was sent back along the communications
network to keep the originating unit informed.25
An immediate request mission was required
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the
request took priority over other activities. The
request was sent directly from the Air Support
Party Officer (ASPO) at Division or Corps to the
FUSA G-3 Air. This process could be expedited
by the diversion of airborne aircraft from less
important targets or by keeping aircraft and
crews on a high state of readiness at their
airfields. General Quesada reported that in most
cases, missions requested SAP required 60-80
minutes from the time of the request until the
arrival of aircraft over the target. 26 Air support
request records for the first week in July reveal
that the response times were much longer. On
average it took 88 minutes from the time a
request was submitted until the ground unit
received notification on the status of the request.
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an
average of nearly four hours after the request was
made. This, however, was a huge improvement
compared to the period immediately following
D-Day when SAP missions were not a realistic
option. As the month of July progressed, the
number of SAP missions recorded in the daily
operational summaries declined significantly
while the response times improved. The decline
in SAP missions was not due to a reduced need
for air support but rather was caused by a shift

in policy. As the campaign progressed the
improved communications facilities combined
with more experienced personnel to allow low
priority p l a n n e d m i s s i o n s a n d a r m e d
reconnaissance flights to be diverted and briefed
in the air to meet SAP target requests. Following
Operation "Cobra," SAP missions disappeared
completely from the mission records as they were
replaced by armoured column cover and armed
reconnaissance flights.
The Air Support Parties, discussed above,
were an integral component of the air support
system. The principle role of the ASP was to act
as the conduit for all ground force air support
requests. The ASPO worked closely with both
the G-3 Air and the commander of the unit to
which he was assigned. As a qualified flying
officer, the ASPO brought with him an intimate
knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of
close support aircraft. In this capacity the ASPO
acted as the Air Commander's representative on
the division or corps staff. He advised the Ground
Force commander on all matters pertaining to
air support, in particular, the suitability of targets
selected for attack. 27 The ASP was equipped with
a complete communications system to relay
requests to the combined control centre.
In the period following the capture of
Cherbourg the Army and Air Force moved
towards closer cooperation. By the middle of July
it was standard practice for incoming flights to
contact the ASPO about five minutes before they
reached the target area. This allowed the pilots
to be briefed on the latest target intelligence and
be informed which coloured smoke would be
used. Once the attack had been completed the
flight or squadron leader would radio the results
of his attack to the ASPO and thus provide the
Army with the most up-to-date intelligence.28 The
principle advantage of this evolution, or
maturation, of the air support system was
increased flexibility. No longer was it necessary
to provide the pilots with a detailed pre-flight
briefing. It was now possible for missions to be
arranged very quickly, even while the aircraft were
in the air. The pilots could be contacted by the
ASPO and briefed on the location and nature of
the target. When the aircraft arrived in the general
area, the artillery would mark the exact targets
to be attacked. This was a significant change from
the manner in which operations were conducted
during the early days of Overlord.
13
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The full capabilities of the evolving air
support system were shown by an incident which
occurred on the evening of 17 July. In the push
to capture St. Lo, the 116th Infantry Regiment
of the 2 9 t h Division found itself low on
ammunition and facing a strong German
counterattack. The first small probing attacks
were repulsed with the aid of artillery fire, but a
force of enemy tanks could be seen preparing
for a renewed assault. At about 2000 hours a
request for air support was sent to IX TAC. The
call was answered in just over an hour by a
squadron of Thunderbolts from the 404th Fighter
Bomber Group based at Airfield A-5 in Chippelle,
France. The pilots received their final briefing in
the air from the ASPO of the 29th Division, Major
Horace B. Wetherall, and spent 60 minutes over
the target area bombing all potential targets. The
air strikes were made immediately in front of
the American lines and numerous German
soldiers ran into the American lines to avoid
being bombed. Though the pilots reported seeing
no tanks and claimed bomb hits on only one
vehicle and a house, Major-General C.H. Gerhart,
Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division,
credited the attacks with a major role in repelling
the counterattack. It was through the close
coordination between the squadron and the
ASPO that the pilots were quickly briefed and
kept informed of the American positions so they
could make their attacks dangerously close to
the troops they were protecting.29 The support of
the 29th Division by IX TAC was just one of six
missions flown in support of XIX Corps on 17
July.30
At 0938 hours on 25 July attacks by eight
squadrons of Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers
opened Operation "Cobra," a major offensive
designed to crack through the main line of
German resistance. The fighter-bomber target
was the slender band immediately opposite the

American troops poised to attack. This area,
south of the St. Lo-Périers highway, was 250
yards wide and 7,000 yards long. The fighterbombers were followed by heavy and medium
bomber attacks. They saturated the target area,
extending 1500 yards beyond die fighter-bomber
target area. Unfortunately there were short
bombings which caused over 600 friendly
casualties and a great deal of disorganization
among the waiting troops. 31
Despite the confusion, the ground attack
began only slightly late, at 1100 hours. At the
same time, a second wing of fighter-bombers
commenced its attacks. It concentrated the attack
on the same strip of land. IX TAC judged the
results of its missions to be "excellent and beyond
our expectations."32
Following the initial fighter-bomber attacks,
units of IX TAC were allocated to support VII
Corps for the remainder of the day. A number of
immediate request missions were flown against
a m m u n i t i o n a n d petrol d u m p s , troop
concentrations, and gun positions. Two church
steeples being used as observations posts by the
Germans were destroyed. A number of armed
reconnaissance and interdiction missions were
also carried out to engage and destroy a variety
of targets ranging from motor transport, tanks,
and horse-drawn vehicles to a number of bridge
and railway targets. At the end of the day, P-47s
from the 366th and 368th Fighter Groups
deployed a series of delayed action bombs on
the crossroads around Coutances. The bombs
were fused to detonate after one to twelve hours
in the hope of disrupting German convoys using
the cover of darkness. 33
"Cobra" was the t u r n i n g point in the
Normandy
campaign.
The
massive
bombardment paved the way for the breakout
by the US armoured divisions and forced the
Germans to re-evaluate their position in France.
This was recognized within days by FUSA. On
28 July, Bradley wrote to Eisenhower to express
his optimism:

Major-General Elwood "Pete" Quesada (right) sits in
a jeep with Air Chief Marshal Sir Trqfford LeighMallory during a visit to a 9th Air Force station in
Normandy.
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A P-47 flies low over the tank column it is supporting.
To say that the personnel of the First Army
Headquarters is riding high tonight is putting it
mildly. Things on our front really look good...
This operation could not have been the success
it has been without such close cooperation of
the Air. In the first place, the bombardment
which we gave them last Tuesday [July 25] was
apparently highly successful even though we did
suffer m a n y c a s u a l t i e s o u r s e l v e s . The
cooperation of Quesada's IX TAC Air Command
has been outstanding. He has kept formations
over the advancing columns continuously. 34

Bradley alludes to the introduction of a new
tactic in the provision of close air support which
changed the pattern of operations - Armoured
Column Cover (ACC).
The planners of Operation "Cobra" were
concerned that they could not provide close air
support to the mobile tank columns once they
had broken through. To that point in the
campaign, the most effective air support was
during periods of static warfare. The relatively
slow speed with which air support requests were
processed could make them out of date by the

time the aircraft reached the target area. The
request system had to adapt to a rapidly changing
environment.
By most accounts it was General Quesada
who came up with the idea for ACC.35 He had to
persuade Bradley to assign him a Sherman tank
so he could conduct tests to determine the
feasibility of the concept. It took a while for IX
TAC to get its tank. The first tank was mistakenly
delivered to the 9th Armoured Division by an
ordnance officer who believed that the destination
"IX TAC" on his orders was a typo. On the second
try at delivery, the tanks were refused at IX TAC
headquarters by an Air Force officer who was
unaware of Quesada's plan. It took a third
attempt before the situation was straightened
out.36 The concept of ACC was tested starting on
19 July when a team from IX TAC arrived with
their modified tank at 2nd Armoured Division's
Combat Command A to begin trials. Within a
week the new technique had been proven and
was ready for operational deployment. 37
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The concept of armoured column cover was
simple. An army crew manned a Sherman tank
which contained a VHF radio (type SCR 522) run
by a division air support party officer. This tank
operated at the front of an advancing armoured
column. In support of the column, and in direct
contact with it, was a flight of four fighterbombers. The air-ground team worked very
closely together. The tank commander benefitted
from the air cover in two ways. First, he could
use the aircraft as an immediate source of
information. The pilots could be asked to scout
ahead of the column and locate areas of enemy
resistance. The pilots would also communicate
anything they saw that could be a possible hazard
to the ground forces. The second, and more
revolutionary innovation of ACC was the
delegation of target control to the commander of
the armoured combat command. Any targets that
blocked the path of the armoured column could
be assigned to the orbiting aircraft. These targets
would then be immediately attacked. If the target
was larger than the flight could handle or if the
aircraft expended their bombs, ammunition or
fuel, additional aircraft could quickly be
summoned. Successive flights of aircraft would
provide cover during daylight hours for the
column. Each flight would remain on station for
30 to 90 minutes. It would then be replaced by
another flight. Besides answering the requests
of the armoured column, the ACC flight was free
to seek out and destroy targets of opportunity. 38

Support Party Officer attached to Combat
Command A of the 2nd Armoured Division from
22 July to 6 August 1944. During his time with
the division he was very impressed with the
results obtained through the use of ACC. He
compared the role of the ASPO to that of the
artillery forward observer. The commander of
Combat Command A, Brigadier-General Maurice
Rose, was very skeptical of the role of close
support aircraft after being bombed repeatedly
by friendly aircraft in Italy. However, Zimmerman
reported that in his experience the accuracy of
the supporting fighter-bombers had been
excellent. He attributed the success to the ability
of the ASPO to direct the aircraft right onto the
target.41 The G-3 Air of FUSA was equally lavish
in his praise of ACC. He credited the new system
with the destruction of over 2,000 motor vehicles,
200 tanks and 80 artillery pieces in the first week
following its implementation. As well, ACC was
responsible for disrupting the movement of
German reserves, destroying the retreating
columns and ensuring the continued success of
the breakthrough. 4 2 The FUSA Report on
Operations stated that ACC produced results,
"far beyond all expectations..."

Armoured column cover was used for the first
time on 26 July, the day after the launch of
"Cobra." On that day 75 ACC missions were
dispatched comprised of over 300 aircraft. Only
three did not complete their missions. The next
day an even greater effort of over 100 missions
was mounted. 39

T h e N i n t h Air F o r c e w a s n o l e s s e b u l l i e n t i n i t s
p r a i s e of A C C :

The scale of air effort put forth by IX TAC in
the period following "Cobra" was enormous.
From 26 July to 31 July, the Command executed
9,185 sorties. To put this effort in perspective,
the average number of sorties per day during the
month of July was 489. Following "Cobra" an
average of 1,312 sorties were flown each day. A
significant proportion of those sorties were
committed to ACC.40

Close cooperation between the air and ground
became the norm rather than the exception. On
27 July, Combat Command B of 2nd Armoured
Division was racing south in an attempt to
encircle the retreating German forces. The
s p e a r h e a d was being led by t h e 8 2 n d
Reconnaissance Battalion. In general, light
resistance was being met. However, at the town
of Quibou a German roadblock was encountered.
In a model of combined operations, a detachment
from the reconnaissance unit kept pressure on
the front of the p o s i t i o n while a n o t h e r
detachment attempted to outflank it. They

From the start, ACC was very well received
by both the air and the ground. LieutenantColonel J a m e s L. Zimmerman was an Air

The results obtained by the employment of the
tank-air team In mobile, fast moving situations
are recognized a s b e i n g a n o u t s t a n d i n g
achievement in air-ground cooperation and
represent the development of an unbeatable
combination. 43

...the outstanding development in connection
with the rendering of direct support by the Ninth
Air Force has been the establishment of full
cooperation between Fighter Bombers and
armoured columns. 44
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Scenes of destruction in the Roncey Pocket. Top: A German half-track (likely overturned by aerial bombs)
and a knocked-out Panzer Mark IV tank bear silent witness to a row of German graves. Above left: A French
farm cart and an American dispatch rider pass by smashed German transport just outside of Roncey. Above
right: Wrecked German armour and transport in the square at Roncey.
received artillery s u p p o r t from the self-propelled
g u n s of the 7 8 t h Armoured Field Battalion a n d
air s u p p o r t from a s q u a d r o n of IX TAC P-47s
t a s k e d to fly ACC for C o m b a t C o m m a n d B.
G e r m a n resistance crumbled in the face of this
concerted attack. 4 5
Numerous accounts attest to the effectiveness
of ACC. In one case a single S h e r m a n t a n k found
itself s u r r o u n d e d by 13 G e r m a n t a n k s . Its call
for help was quickly answered by a flight of four
T h u n d e r b o l t s . The air a t t a c k s were able to
distract the German armour long enough to allow
the S h e r m a n to beat a h a s t y retreat. 4 6 In another
incident, t a n k s of C o m b a t C o m m a n d A, 2nd
Armoured Division were blocked by a G e r m a n
force l o c a t e d n e a r b y . T h e divisional ASPO
c o n t a c t e d IX TAC flight located overhead to
r e q u e s t an attack. The aircraft m a d e repeated
p a s s e s over the target, so close t h a t it m a d e the
ASPO very nervous. However, he reported that,
"not a single bullet h i t o u r t a n k s , a n d t h e
resistance was knocked out." 47

Tactical air operations in the period following
the b r e a k o u t were not limited to ACC missions.
There were still a wide variety of missions taking
place including planned, r e q u e s t a n d a r m e d
reconnaissance missions. The request missions
most often originated w i t h infantry divisions t h a t
were not accorded the privilege of ACC. This w a s
partly due to the fact that aircraft were b u s y with
other t a s k s , b u t the primary r e a s o n infantry
divisions did not get ACC was the belief that their
air s u p p o r t n e e d s could be m e t t h r o u g h other
c h a n n e l s . There is no d o u b t t h a t the infantry
c o m m a n d e r w o u l d h a v e loved t o h a v e t h e
flexibility i m p a r t e d b y ACC, b u t i n m o s t
situations infantry actions were of a more static
n a t u r e t h a n a r m o u r e d operations. As a r e s u l t
time w a s n o t as critical a factor a n d m o s t air
support needs could be met through the
established planned a n d request channels.
An example of the symbiotic n a t u r e of t h e
air a n d t h e g r o u n d forces o c c u r r e d o n t h e
afternoon of 29 J u l y . The lightning a d v a n c e of
17

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1999

11

Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 2

2nd Armoured Division's Combat Command B
had allowed it to outflank the German forces in
the Roncey area by the night of 28 July. This
placed the unit directly in the path of the
retreating German forces. With pressure from the
north applied by the 3rd and 4th Armoured
Divisions, the Germans found themselves in
danger of being cut-off. During the night they tried
to break free but were unable to get by the cordon
set up by Combat Command B. The next day a
flight from the 405th Fighter Bomber Group on
an armed reconnaissance mission found a huge
concentration of German traffic, in places
bumper-to-bumper, lined up around Roncey
trying to escape the pocket. One pilot estimated
there were an estimated 500 vehicles trapped.
Between 1510 and 2140 hours aircraft from IX
TAC took turns attacking the mass. It was
described as a "fighter-bomber's paradise." To
add to the chaos, American artillery, tanks and
tank destroyers fired at the trapped enemy. When
it was all over, any chance at a German breakout
had evaporated. A ground investigation later
found over 100 tanks and 250 other vehicles in
various stages of destruction and scores more
abandoned intact. The reduction of the enemy
forces in the Roncey pocket was accomplished
by a combination of air attack, direct anti-tank
fire and indirect artillery fire. Cooperation
between the air and the ground could achieve
results that neither could accomplish on their
own.48
In August, close air support continued to be
the primary focus of operations by IX TAC. It is
notable that IX TAC played a major role in
stemming the German counterattack at Mortain
in the second week of August, and then
contributed a large number of sorties to the
destruction of German forces trapped in the
Falaise-Argentan pocket. These operations were
a crucial component of the Allied success in
Normandy, and they showed the growing ease
with which the Ground and Air Forces worked
together. There were no major advances in the
system of cooperation in August, only a growing
competence within the existing system.

Conclusion

P

rior to the start of operations in Normandy, a
doctrine for air s u p p o r t evolved from
American prewar ideas of tactical air power, and

the experience of the North African campaigns.
The result was FM 100-20. Normandy showed
how difficult, if not impossible, was the task of
translating doctrine into practice. The general
framework was useful, but experience rather than
doctrine became the engine which drove
improvements in the system of tactical air
support used by First US Army and IX TAC.
The Americans began the N o r m a n d y
campaign with a system of air support that was
very centralized. All requests for air support had
to be routed through headquarters in England.
The system was so strict that Air Support Parties
were prohibited from speaking directly to aircraft
overhead. As operations progressed and the level
of experience grew the system was gradually
decentralized. In return, the quality of support
increased. The pinnacle of decentralization was
reached with the introduction of Armoured
Column Cover after Operation "Cobra." Air
support requests no longer had to be sent back
to a combined operations room but could be
immediately filled by a flight of aircraft working
closely with the armoured unit below. The
concept of ACC went against many of the
principles contained in FM 100-20. Although the
air c o m m a n d e r retained overall control,
individual ACC missions were used in the "pennypacket" manner condemned in North Africa. As
well as primarily operating in the zone of contact
where FM 100-20 considered activity to be
unprofitable, ACC went against the doctrine and
delegated mission and target priorities to the
local ground force commander.
C o n d i t i o n s , however, h a d c h a n g e d
s u b s t a n t i a l l y since 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 4 3 . Vast
improvements in communications, control
mechanisms, aircraft and coordination between
ground and air units now made ACC a viable
mission. It should be noted that ACC, though a
type of combat air patrol, was very different from
the defensive missions flown in North Africa. ACC
was by definition offensive in nature. Rather than
waiting for the enemy to come to them, aircraft
on ACC missions sought out their targets. In
many cases the defensive patrols in North Africa
intercepted no enemy aircraft or were otherwise
ineffective. The great value of ACC was two-fold
- first was its ability to provide timely information
to the ground forces. The benefits of having an
eye-in-the-sky in close communications cannot
be underestimated. Secondly, putting aside
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successes such as the Roncey Pocket, ACC was
most effective in suppressing, rather than
destroying, the enemy. Aircraft such as the
Thunderbolt carried great destructive power in
the form of bombs, rockets, napalm and machine
guns, but rarely were they able to focus this power
in the manner that has been credited to them.
The effectiveness of ACC accrued from the close
partnership of air and ground forces. When an
armoured column found its way blocked, its
ability to proceed depended on the timely
intervention of air power which more often than
not would mask rather than destroy an enemy
position allowing the ground forces to either
bypass, or close and destroy the position.
While the doctrine of close air support was
changing, so too was the playing field. In North
Africa the Luftwaffe was a significant factor. In
Normandy it was not. In North Africa the Allies
were chronically short of aircraft, men, supplies
and other essentials. In Normandy, by the
standards of 1942-43, there was an abundance
of almost everything. These two factors alone
accounted for much of the change. It was also
significant that the Air Force no longer considered
it probable that it would be engulfed by the Army.
The air force was prepared to endorse a more
decentralized air support system (ie. a system
over which they exercised less control) in order
to improve its efficiency. By no accounts had the
perfect air support system been created by the
end of the fighting in Normandy. What had
evolved, however, was an efficient system that
allowed the Air and Ground Forces to form an
effective working relationship. Neither side
completely abandoned its hopes for dominance
or independence, but together they had learned,
under less-than-ideal circumstances, how best
to work together.
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